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African-American Committee Chairs in
U.S. State Legislaturesn
Byron D’Andra Orey, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
L. Marvin Overby, University of Missouri
Christopher W. Larimer, University of Northern Iowa
Objective. In this article, we explore whether African-American state legislators
have been able to translate election to office into positions of power, particularly as
committee chairs. Methods. We cull data from all state legislative chambers that
contained a black legislator during two time periods, 1989 and 1999. In doing so,
we compare the observed numbers of African-American chairs with their expected
numbers. We also examine each state’s percentage of black chairs using multiple
regression to determine what factors—political, partisan, institutional, cultural—
influence the selection of black committee chairs. Results. Overall, our descriptive
analysis reveals that blacks are underrepresented as chairs. They are not, however,
significantly underrepresented as chairs of the most important committees and they
are generally overrepresented as chairs of committees with jurisdiction over social
services. Our multivariate analyses show that the prevalence of black chairs is driven
primarily by factors related to partisan control of legislative chambers and size of the
black legislative delegation, and that these dynamics have changed over time. Con-
clusion. Although the increase in African-American state legislators has led to an
increase in substantive leadership roles, these positions have been limited almost
entirely to chambers where the black caucus is a critical element of a Democratic
majority.
As the United States enters the 21st century, race continues to be
the distinctively ‘‘American dilemma’’ identified by Myrdal (1944) over
60 years ago. Although African Americans have made substantial progress
in many areas, numerous economic, social, and political problems persist.
In the political arena, African Americans have made considerable
advances since the passage of the Voting Rights Act in the mid-
1960s. Although election rates still lag behind their percentage of the
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article. We also express our thanks to Joel Wiegert and Mitch Herrian for their data-
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population,1 the past several decades have seen minority enfranchisement
translated into the election of significant numbers of minority representa-
tives at the local, state, and national levels. In this article, we examine an
underexplored aspect of minority representation, the extent to which
African-American representatives have attained significant positions of in-
fluence in policy-making institutions, specifically the rates at which they
serve as committee chairs in state legislatures. With key provisions of the
Voting Rights Act renewed in 2006, it seems an appropriate time to assess
the degree to which African Americans have been able to translate their
presence in state legislatures into an ability to have a significant impact on
policy. Since committees play such an important role in legislative decision
making, an examination of the prevalence—or paucity—of black committee
chairs will allow us important insights into the extent to which African
Americans have gained substantive, as well as merely descriptive, represen-
tation. Our analysis will also illuminate recent changes in the dynamics
of black political empowerment in the states and allow us to explore the
conditions that promote greater African-American political influence in state
legislatures.
Background
In the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act (VRA), Congress
significantly expanded state responsibility to take proactive steps to max-
imize minority representation; and in the 1986 case of Thornburg v. Gingles,
the Supreme Court introduced three explicit standards for determining vote
dilution.2 These standards played a vital role in increasing the number of
minority elected officials nationwide. The full impact of the new federal
guidelines was felt in the redistricting required following the 1990 Census.
Prior to this redistricting cycle, African-American voters constituted a
majority in only 15 congressional districts nationwide. Following the re-
districting cycle, the number of such districts nearly doubled nationwide, up
to 27. At the state-legislative level, the numbers are even more impressive.
Nationwide, the amended VRA resulted in the creation of 57 new
state senate districts and 109 new state house districts in which there were
African-American majorities (APSA, 1993). A good percentage of this
increase in minority representation has come in southern states, where a
majority of African Americans reside. Although historically the states of the
1For instance, while African Americans constitute roughly 12 percent of the U.S. pop-
ulation, they account for only 8 percent of the members of Congress (Davidson and Oleszek,
2006:121).
2Under the so-called Gingles criteria, the Court established a three-part test to determine
violations of the Voting Rights Act: ‘‘Is a minority group sufficiently large and compact to
form a majority in a district? Is it politically cohesive? Is there evidence of racially polarized
voting against it?’’ (Butler and Cain, 1992:36).
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former Confederacy went to extraordinary lengths to disfranchise minority
voters, dilute the impact of those who did vote, and limit—if not elim-
inate—minority office holders, the Voting Rights Act and its amendments
have resulted in a ‘‘quiet revolution’’ in the region (Davidson and Grofman,
1994) that has resulted in the election of significant numbers of minority
lawmakers in every southern state. Here we seek to assess how far this ‘‘quiet
revolution’’ has worked its way up the legislative ladder, examining the
extent to which minority electoral success has been translated into effective
legislative power, in the South and elsewhere.
Given the historic increase in the number of black elected officials, ques-
tions abound regarding their effectiveness in substantively representing Af-
rican-American interests. Central to this debate is whether electing black
officials results in an increase in policy outputs favored by blacks. Pitkin’s
seminal work on representation (1967) distinguishes three types of repre-
sentation. She argues that representation can be descriptive in that legislators
and those they represent share similar physical traits, such as ethnicity, race,
or gender; symbolic in that legislators have the confidence of those they
represent, even if they accomplish little in terms of policy; or substantive in
that legislators deliver policy outcomes that are favored by their constituents.
Following the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its amendments
in 1982, African Americans clearly experienced an increase in descriptive
representation, but it is less clear whether this descriptive representation
has been translated into substantive representation. Indeed, much recent
scholarship has questioned this point explicitly, enumerating the political
tradeoffs that often accompany the creation of majority-minority districts.
Scholars such as Brace, Grofman, and Handley (1987), Bullock (1995),
Hill (1995), Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran (1996), Lublin (1997),
Lublin and Voss (2000), and Shotts (2001) have all argued that racial
redistricting tends to ‘‘waste’’ at least some Democratic voters and can lead
to significant Republican electoral gains. Swain (1993) and Overby and
Cosgrove (1996) show a further ‘‘waste’’ of minority constituents, leading
surviving white Democratic legislators to be less sympathetic to minority
policy concerns.
However, relatively few studies have empirically examined the behavior of
African-American legislators and the positions they hold in the legislative
process (but see Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Legette, 2000; Orey, 2000;
Grose, 2005; Orey and Smooth, forthcoming). It is possible that even ac-
counting for the tradeoffs enumerated by critics, the election of more black
legislators increases substantive representation of black interests by increas-
ing the number of African Americas who hold positions of substantial leg-
islative authority. This study will give us some purchase on that question, as
it relates to committee leadership.
Since the passage of the VRA, research in the area has evolved over ‘‘four
generations.’’ In their study of the impact of voting rights from 1965
to 1990, Davidson and Grofman (1994) indicate that ‘‘first-generation’’
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research questions focused on minority enfranchisement matters from the
1960s; ‘‘second-generation’’ questions dealt with subsequent vote dilution
efforts and the election of minority officeholders. ‘‘Third-generation’’ re-
search questions have examined the extent to which minority officials are
able to ‘‘become an integral part of the political process: operating inside the
system without being discriminated against, forming multiethnic coalitions,
and working out resolutions to problems with fellow officials, in short
finding acceptance as active, influential players in the mainstream political
game’’ (Davidson and Grofman, 1994:14). ‘‘Fourth-generation’’ research
examines whether black legislators are able to introduce and pass legislation
on behalf of their constituents. Unfortunately, most of the research exam-
ining these issues has focused on first-, second-, and fourth-generation
questions, leaving something of a void in our understanding of critical third-
generation questions. In this article, our focus on African-American com-
mittee chairs addresses this imbalance in the literature, examining a critical
and largely overlooked topic from the ‘‘third generation.’’
We focus on state legislative committee chairs for several reasons. First,
committee chairs have considerable power in most legislative chambers,
including the states. As Jewell and Patterson (1986:154) conclude, ‘‘com-
mittee procedures and practices in many states give the chair[s] . . . a great
deal of leeway in running the committees’’ (see also Lacy, 1967; Keefe and
Ogul, 2001).3 Chairs often use this latitude to enhance their influence in
terms of setting the legislative agenda, prioritizing legislation, influencing
what bills make it to the floor (and in what form), affecting fiscal priorities,
and the like.4
Second, unlike in the Congress, where chairs are chosen through a (more
or less rigid) seniority system (see, e.g., Gerber, 1996), in the states there is
more diversity in the selection process. Party leaders make many such ap-
pointments, although some states use chamberwide elections, caucus selec-
tions, or committees-on-committees to choose committee chairs; only four
state legislative chambers rely solely on seniority. Given the relative recent-
ness of the election of large numbers of minorities to the nation’s legislative
bodies and the torpid pace at which actuarial forces can affect seniority, we
3Hall’s (1996) observations about selective participation among members of Congress
undoubtedly pertain to state legislators as well. One reason why state legislative chairs are
powerful is that they focus their energies on committee work and opt to participate when
rank-and-file members are distracted by other tasks.
4The Supreme Court has certainly recognized this point in recent decisions regarding
assessment of minority representation. In her opinion in the 2003 case of Georgia v. Ashcroft,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote: ‘‘one other method of assessing the minority group’s
opportunity to participate in the political process is to examine the comparative position of
legislative leadership, influence, and power for representatives of the benchmark majority-
minority districts. Indeed, in a representative democracy, the very purpose of voting is to
delegate to chosen representatives the power to make and pass laws. The ability to exert more
control over that process is at the core of exercising political power. A lawmaker with more
legislative influence has more potential to set the agenda, to participate in closed-door
meetings, to negotiate from a stronger position, and to shake hands on a deal.’’
622 Social Science Quarterly
would expect to see evidence of meaningful percentages of minority chairs in
the state houses before they appear on Capitol Hill.
Third, an analogous study by Darcy (1996) regarding female committee
chairs in state legislatures provides a readily adaptable template for our
current project. Darcy’s techniques and use of basic probability statistics
have proven useful in assessing the institutional power of female legislators,
and lend themselves to similar assessments in regard to African-American
legislators. In addition, we supplement his statistical techniques with
multivariate analysis to explore with greater rigor the conditions that fa-
cilitate the ability of minority legislators to rise to the level of committee
leadership.
In the following sections, we outline our expectations more fully, discuss
the data and methods we employ, summarize our findings, and consider
what these findings imply about the status of black political empowerment
and the utility of majority-minority legislative districting.
Expectations
To guide our exploration, we will discuss a number of expectations, which
in turn suggest a series of testable propositions related to minority political
empowerment and legislative representation.
Darcy (1996) found that female legislators were not proportionately un-
derrepresented as committee chairs; however, historically, the level of prej-
udice in the United States has been much stronger toward citizens of African
descent than it has been toward women. Although the political manifes-
tations of that prejudice have abated since the 1960s, we suspect that Af-
rican-American legislators continue to be underrepresented in positions of
legislative leadership. For example, Haynie (2002) finds that even after
obtaining office, African-American legislators are at a disadvantage relative
to nonblack legislators. His findings reveal that African-American legislators
tend to be viewed as less effective by their fellow colleagues in the legislature
than their nonblack counterparts, even after controlling for positions of
power (Haynie, 2002:304). This leads us to suspect that, unlike the situation
with female legislators, relative to their numbers in the parent chamber,
African-American state legislators will be underrepresented as committee
chairs.
Our second expectation concerns majority-minority districting schemes.
Critics of such procedures have argued that overtly packed, majority-
minority districts are counterproductive, in part because they can lead to
increased animosity among otherwise sympathetic white lawmakers, a
point made strongly by Guinier (1994). There is reason to suspect this
is especially true among white Democrats, who in many states watched
the Republican Party join forces with black Democrats to advocate for
the creation of majority-minority districts that put many of them in electoral
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danger.5 From the front lines, an African-American state legislator in Mis-
sissippi noted that following the state’s redistricting in the early 1990s:
there has been an effort to send a message to us, and to black Mississip-
pians, that no matter what your numbers in the legislature, we’re going to
still control things. . . . We no longer have the clout that we once had with
those progressive whites, because they feel that they were betrayed [in the
redistricting process], and in general they were. (Rep. Barney Schoby,
National Public Radio, 1993)
If elite-level bias does accompany the creation of majority-minority dis-
tricting in such a way as to make it more difficult for African-American
legislators to exercise legislative power through committee leadership, it
should be most apparent in the South, the region with the most tortured
history of racial tension and the most experience with racially-motivated
redistricting. Therefore, we expect that compared to their numbers in the
parent chamber, African Americans will be more underrepresented among
the ranks of committee chairs in southern state legislatures than in non-
southern legislatures.
Of course, it is a matter of faith among legislative scholars that not all
committees are created equal and that in the legislative pecking order the
most important are those that deal with monetary matters (such as taxation
policy and spending decisions) and those that control the access of legis-
lation to the floor (i.e., rules committees) (Fenno, 1973; Mayhew, 1974;
Smith and Deering, 1990). Even if African-American representatives have
been able to rise to the rank of committee chairs, if they are underrepre-
sented among the leaders of these powerful committees, their influence in
state legislatures may be artificially attenuated in relation to their numbers.
There is at least some reason to believe this is the case. In his study of the
Mississippi Legislature, Orey (2000) quotes a prominent black legislator
arguing that members of the assembly’s African-American caucus were sys-
tematically excluded from the chamber’s ‘‘money committees.’’6 Based on
such observations, we expect that relative to their numbers in the parent
chamber, African-American representatives will be underrepresented as
chairs of important fiscal, rules, and business committees in U.S. state leg-
islatures.
Relatedly, and as the flip side of the previous hypothesis, we speculate that
African-American legislators may be better represented among the leadership
ranks of certain other types of committees. Bratton and Haynie (1999; see
also Haynie, 2001; Orey and Smooth, forthcoming), for instance, have
5At the congressional level, Bullock (1995) notes that ‘‘all districts held by Democrats in
1991 in which redistricting reduced the black percentage by more than 10 points have now
fallen to the Republicans’’ (see, however, Engstrom, 2006).
6See also Haynie (2002). Similarly, Darcy (1996) found that female representatives were
underrepresented on legislative rules committees, but not on fiscal or business-related com-
mittees.
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found that African-American legislators are more likely than their white
counterparts to introduce legislation that addresses education, health, and
social welfare matters. Since such issue areas have traditionally been of
interest to African-American legislators, it seems reasonable to expect that
compared to their overall numbers, African-American legislators will be
better represented as chairs of committees whose jurisdictions include
education, health, and social welfare policy than as chairs of other types of
committees.
Fifth, following earlier work on female legislators (especially Darcy,
Welch, and Clark, 1994; Darcy, 1996), we suspect that some methods of
chair selection may be more favorable to African Americans than are others.
Generally speaking, rules that permit the selection of committee chairs by
legislative leaders may provide for greater ability to ‘‘balance tickets’’ and to
fix accountability than rules that permit the election of chairs (Darcy, 1996),
therefore promoting the appointment of minority committee chairs. Hay-
nie’s (2002) finding that legislators tend to view their African-American
colleagues as less effective than their nonblack colleagues further suggests
that chair appointment methods that allow for the selection of committee
chairs, as opposed to election, may be advantageous to African-American
legislators. Therefore, we hypothesize that African-American committee
chairs will be more prevalent in legislatures that select rather than elect such
posts.
Sixth, term-limited legislatures may well decrease opportunities for black
legislators to achieve higher levels of leadership. Gerber’s (1996) study of the
U.S. Congress reveals that African Americans are less likely to exit office
when compared to other members of Congress. Based on these findings,
Gerber posits that ‘‘African Americans representatives would be hit espe-
cially hard by legislative term limits’’ (1996:843; see also Carey, Niemi, and
Powell, 2000; on the effect of term limits on the value of committee chairs
generally, see Carey et al., 2006). We suspect, therefore, that African-
American legislators will be less likely to hold committee chairs in legislative
chambers where term limits have taken effect.
Finally, African Americans—at both the elite and mass levels—are much
more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than with the GOP.
Indeed, the size of this partisan disparity is the principal factor that forces
our analysis to diverge somewhat from Darcy’s previous work on female
legislators. Although there is a noticeable gender gap between the parties at
both mass and elite levels in the United States, it is quite small in com-
parison to the racial gap. At the mass level, the partisan gender gap usually
falls within the range of high single or low double digits, in terms of both
party identification and vote choice. At the elite level, this is matched by a
larger number of Democratic female elected officials. Of the 83 women
serving in the 109th Congress (69 in the House, 14 in the Senate), roughly
two-thirds are Democrats (46 members of Congress, nine senators). Sim-
ilarly, over the past 25 years or so, roughly 60 percent of female state
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legislators have been Democrats (National Conference of State Legislatures,
2005). In contrast, the racial gap between the parties is much larger. At the
mass level, it is common to see an 80-point gap between the black vote for
Democratic and Republican candidates. This translates to a much larger
black presence among Democratic elected officials than among Republicans.
In the 109th Congress, of the 43 African-American members of the House
(42) and Senate (one), all are Democrats. Figures at the state-legislative level
are almost as lopsided. In 1989, there were only two black Republican state
legislators nationwide; by 1999, that number had grown, but only to three.7
This partisan disparity has both substantive and methodological implica-
tions for our analysis. Since they are such an important, loyal core
constituency for the Democratic Party, we suspect there is probably an
interactive effect at work when it comes to the appointment of committee
chairs, with black legislators more likely to be rewarded with chair positions
as their importance to the maintenance of a Democratic majority grows. We
summarize this expectation by hypothesizing that African-American com-
mittee chairs will be especially prevalent in chambers that have both Dem-
ocratic majorities and sizable contingents of black legislators. Conversely,
since the numbers of black Republican state legislators are so diminishingly
small, in our multivariate analysis we include interactive terms for each other
independent variable and Democratic control of the legislative chamber,
which will allow us to focus more clearly on the factors that are important
for the emergence of black committee chairs in those chambers where such
an outcome is a real political possibility (i.e., in chambers with Democratic
majorities).
In the following sections, after summarizing our data and methods, we
subject these expectations to empirical scrutiny, first by describing the dis-
tribution of African-American committee chairs across the state legislatures,
and then in a more sophisticated fashion by examining the factors that appear
to contribute to their selection and how such factors change over time.
Data and Methods
We rely heavily on data on state legislative committee chairs collected by
the Council of State Governments, the 1993 Black Elected Officials directory
(Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 1993) and the 1999–2000
Directory of African American Legislators published by the National Black
Caucus of State Legislators.
7None of these three black Republican state legislators served as a committee chair in
1999–2000. It is worth noting that unlike in the U.S. Congress, where committee chairs are
always members of the majority party, state legislative chambers do sometimes allow mem-
bers of the minority party to chair committees. Although this is an unusual practice, in 1999–
2000, five black Democrats chaired committees in GOP-controlled legislative chambers (one
in the South Carolina House, three in the Virginia House of Delegates, and one in the Texas
Senate).
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Following Darcy (1996), our first task is a descriptive one, comparing the
actual number of African Americans selected to chair state legislative com-
mittees with the number that would be expected given their prevalence in
the parent chamber. In our case, we examine ‘‘snapshots’’ from two periods
of recent history: the late 1980s, immediately before the most extensive
round of racial redistricting to date brought large numbers of new African-
American officeholders into state legislatures, and the late 1990s, the end of
a decade of such redistricting. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to
understand that other factors also affect chairs’ selection and to control for
these influences. In his study of female legislative chairs, Darcy (1996)
concluded that when evaluating how well actual numbers of female chairs
comport with predictions based on the number of women legislators in a
legislature, it is necessary to account for legislative chamber, political party,
and seniority.8 Following Darcy (1996), we account for the relevant ‘‘pools’’
from which African-American committee chairs could be drawn and eval-
uate the number of chairs actually selected from each relevant ‘‘pool’’ with
the number of chairs we would expect to be selected from it purely on the
basis of its size. Within states, we compute the expected numbers of African-
American chairs by calculating the proportion of committee chairs selected
from each pool, multiplying this by the percentage of African-American
legislators in the pool, and then sum across all pools.9
Table 1 summarizes relevant information concerning the relative fre-
quency of committee chairs among important legislative subgroups across
the states for the latter of the time periods we consider here (i.e., 1999–
2000).
Moving beyond the example provided by Darcy, we will also attempt to
account for the variations we see in the numbers of black committee chairs
across state legislative chambers, employing multivariate equations and or-
dinary least squares models. Our dependent variable is the percentage of all
committee chairs in each state legislative chamber who are African Amer-
ican.10 Our independent variables are designed to permit us to test the
expectations outlined above. They include, first, a measure of partisan con-
8Some sense of this can be gleaned from Table 1, which shows that senators, Democrats,
and nonfreshman legislators are considerably more likely to be committee chairs than are
house members, Republicans, and freshmen.
9An example used by Darcy (1996) may help explain this procedure. During the period of
his study, the lower house of the Michigan Legislature consisted of 110 members, of whom
20 were Republican freshmen. Of these GOP freshmen, seven (35 percent) served as com-
mittee chairs and five (25 percent) were women. Hence, the expected number of freshman
female Republican committee chairs in the Michigan lower house was (0.35)(0.25)
(20)5 1.75. Similar computations for freshmen Democrats and senior members of both
parties yielded a total expectation of 11.84 female committee chairs. When Darcy compared
this with the 14 female chairs actually found in the Michigan House of Representatives, he
calculated that women held 2.16 more chairs than expected (14 – 11.84).
10We opt to use percentages due to the large variation among the state legislative chambers
in terms of number of committees. We find very similar results when using numbers of black
chairs, rather than percentages, as our dependent variable.
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trol of the chamber, coded 1 for chambers with a Democratic majority and 0
otherwise. We also include the percentage of African-American members in
each chamber, a regional variable (coded 1 for the 11 states of the old
Confederacy, 0 otherwise), a measure tapping chair selection techniques
(coded 1 if chamber rules permit the presiding officer or some other leader
to appoint chairs and 0 otherwise), the relative seniority of the black leg-
islative delegation (coded as the percentage of black freshman in each
chamber), and a control variable for chamber level (with state upper houses
coded 1, lower houses 0). In our equations for 1999–2000, we also include a
measure of whether the state had invoked term limits on its state legislators.
Finally, as noted above, we interact each of these last six variables with the
partisan variable, which allows us to determine their effect in chambers with
Democratic majorities.
Findings
In our first cut at the data, we examine overall rates of African-American
committee chairmanships in our sample of 40 states during 1989, compar-
ing expected rates with those actually observed.11 The findings summarized
TABLE 1
Number of Members and Number of Committee Chairs for Various State
Legislative Groups 1999–2000
Group
Number of
Members
Number of
Committee Chairs
Probability of
Member Being Chair
Chamber
Senate 1,968 903 0.46
House 5,414 1,087 0.20
Party
Republican 3,000 596 0.20
Democrat 4,333 1,376 0.32
Class
Freshman 1,065 49 0.05
Other 6,317 1,941 0.31
Race
African American 573 116 0.20
Other 6,809 1,880 0.28
All 7,382 1,990 0.27
11We exclude from our analysis all states and individual chambers that do not possess any
black legislators. For both years we exclude both chambers in Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine,
Montana, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. For 1989, we exclude both chambers in New
Mexico and South Dakota; we exclude the upper houses in Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Vermont, and West Virginia; and the lower house in Iowa. For 1999, we exclude the upper
chambers in Arizona, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Vermont, and West
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in Table 2 reveal a mean difference of approximately  0.20 between the
observed number of chairs and the expected number of chairs across all
(upper and lower) chambers. The t statistic generated by this comparison
( 1.9) is sufficient to meet the threshold of statistical significance
( p  0.06), in line with our initial expectation that African Americans are
underrepresented as committee chairs.
As the findings summarized in Table 3 attest, the total number of black
committee chairs remained almost constant over the decade, increasing
by only one (from 115 in 1989 to 116 by 1999).12 So, at first glance, the
descriptive analyses suggest that the increase in descriptive representation
failed to yield an increase in black legislative chairs. Moreover, at the same
time, the marked increase in the overall number of African Americans serving
in state legislatures drives up our expected observations, resulting in a sig-
nificantly larger mean difference ( 0.61) than observed at the end of the
preceding decade. In turn, this generates a much larger—and much more
robustly significant—t statistic ( 3.32, p  0.001).13
One plausible explanation behind African-American legislators’ failure to
increase their number of legislative chairmanships is partisanship.14 A quick
glimpse at recent trends in state legislative politics reveals that the Dem-
ocratic Party suffered significant setbacks at the state level over the course of
the 1990s. At the end of the 1980s, Democrats enjoyed a sizable advantage
in the state capitals. In the nation’s 98 partisan state legislative chambers
(i.e., with the exception of Nebraska’s unicameral, nonpartisan legislature),
in 1989 Democrats constituted a majority in fully three-quarters (73). A
decade later, however, their numbers had slipped dramatically. As of 2000,
the GOP controlled a majority (51) of state legislative chambers, leaving
Democrats with a majority in only 47. Although we will return to consider
this matter somewhat more below, the combination of nearly monotonic
black support for the Democratic Party coupled with the GOP’s state-level
surge in recent years appears to have had significantly negative consequences
for the policy-making roles of black elected officials.
Virginia. Additionally, in the multivariate analyses we follow convention and exclude the
nonpartisan, unicameral legislature of Nebraska.
12As a close examination of the tables shows, the number of black senate chairs increases
slightly from 39 to 42, but this is offset by a decrease in the number of blacks chairing lower
chamber committees (from 76 to 74).
13An examination of some of the individual state results reported in Table 3 is instructive.
Although some southern states have consistently and notably lower numbers of black com-
mittee chairs than expected (e.g., Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina), others (such as
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Texas) show split results. Alabama has more African-Amer-
ican committee chairs than expected in both its upper and lower houses, and the positive
discrepancy between observed and expected chairs in the Alabama Senate is the largest in our
data set. Conversely, the largest negative discrepancy is found not in a southern state leg-
islature, but in the lower chamber in Ohio.
14Just as clearly, though, partisanship is not the only relevant factor. In Mississippi, the
observed number of chairs falls substantially between 1989 and 1999, even though Dem-
ocrats continued to control both chambers.
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TABLE 2
Expected and Observed African-American Chairs by State and House, 1989
Senate African-American
Chairs House African-American Chairs
State Observed Expected O E Observed Expected O E
Alabama 3 2.60 0.40 1 5.01  4.01
Arizona 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Arkansas 1 0.00 1.00 0 0.69  0.69
California 3 2.52 0.48 2 2.44  0.44
Colorado 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Connecticut 2 2.45  0.45 1 0.95 0.05
Delaware 1 1.67  0.67 0 0.00 0.00
Florida 1 2.00  1.00 2 2.95  0.95
Georgia 3 3.85  0.85 3 4.44  1.44
Illinois 5 4.07 0.93 3 5.00  2.00
Indiana 0 0.00 0.00 3 2.27 0.73
Iowa 0 0.00 0.00
Kansas 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Kentucky 0 0.10  0.10 0 0.25  0.25
Louisiana 0 1.80  1.80 3 3.11  0.11
Maryland 1 2.18  1.18 3 2.88 0.12
Massachusetts 1 0.75 0.25 0 0.73  0.73
Michigan 0 0.14  0.14 7 6.53 0.47
Minnesota 0 0.28  0.28
Mississippi 1 1.20  0.20 8 7.72 0.28
Missouri 5 3.45 1.55 6 6.84  0.84
Nebraska 0 0.00 0.00
Nevada 0 0.00 0.00 1 1.00 0.00
New Hampshire 0 0.00 0.00
New Jersey 1 0.86 0.14 0 0.00 0.00
New York 0 0.00 0.00 4 8.00  4.00
North Carolina 3 2.82 0.18 9 8.19 0.81
Ohio 0 0.00 0.00 5 5.30  0.30
Oklahoma 2 0.00 2.00 2 1.68 0.32
Oregon 2 1.69 0.31 1 0.80 0.20
Pennsylvania 0 0.00 0.00 3 2.37 0.63
Rhode Island 0 0.17  0.17 0 0.36  0.36
South Carolina 0 1.61  1.61 2 1.76 0.24
Tennessee 3 1.20 1.80 1 1.93  0.93
Texas 0 0.60  0.60 3 2.84 0.16
Vermont 0 0.23  0.23
Virginia 0 0.42  0.42 0 2.07  2.07
Washington 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.39  0.39
West Virginia 1 0.36 0.64
Wisconsin 1 0.94 0.06 2 2.33  0.33
Total 39 39.09  0.09 76 91.70  15.70
Mean difference5  0.20.
t statistic5 1.90.
P value  0.06 (two-tailed test).
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TABLE 3
Expected and Observed African-American Chairs by State and House, 1999
Senate African-American
Chairs House African-American Chairs
State Observed Expected O – E Observed Expected O – E
Alabama 8 6.32 1.68 9 8.11 0.89
Arizona 0 0.00 0.00
Arkansas 1 1.62  0.62 1 0.83 0.17
California 0 1.33  1.33 4 2.58 1.42
Colorado 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Connecticut 3 3.47 0.53 1 2.63  1.63
Delaware 2 1.83 0.17 0 0.00 0.00
Florida 0 0.45  0.45 0 0.36  0.36
Georgia 5 7.43  2.43 5 10.74  5.74
Illinois 0 0.00 0.00 10 10.62  0.62
Indiana 0 0.00 0.00 3 2.68 0.32
Iowa 0 0.00 0.00
Kansas 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Kentucky 0 0.00 0.00 0 1.24  1.24
Louisiana 5 4.40 0.60 1 2.67  1.67
Maryland 3 3.10  0.10 3 2.72 0.28
Massachusetts 1 0.93 0.07 1 1.10  0.10
Michigan 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Minnesota 0 0.00 0.00
Mississippi 4 7.31  3.31 3 8.50  5.50
Missouri 2 3.35  1.35 3 6.72  3.72
Nebraska 0 0.00 0.00
Nevada 0 0.91  0.91 2 0.92 1.08
New Hampshire 0 0.00 0.00
New Jersey 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.33  0.33
New Mexico 1 0.00 1.00
New York 0 0.32  0.32 6 9.71  3.71
North Carolina 3 4.29  1.29 10 12.82  2.82
Ohio 0 0.00 0.00 0 8.56  8.56
Oklahoma 2 0.97 1.03 2 1.38 0.62
Oregon 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Pennsylvania 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Rhode Island 0 0.17  0.17 0 0.00 0.00
South Carolina 0 2.92  2.92 1 0.46 0.54
South Dakota 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Tennessee 1 1.41  0.41 2 2.85  0.85
Texas 1 0.50 0.50 3 4.40  1.40
Vermont 0 0.00 0.00
Virginia 0 0.00 0.00 3 4.00  1.00
Washington 0 0.61  0.61 0 0.00 0.00
West Virginia 0 0.52  0.52
Wisconsin 1 2.00  1.00 0 0.00 0.00
Total 42 55.64  13.64 74 107.45  33.45
Mean difference5  0.62.
t statistic5  3.32.
P value  0.001.
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Before turning to the multivariate models, we first focus on disaggregating
the data, in order to examine the relative prevalence of African-American
chairs across committee types. Specifically, we are interested in testing our
expectations that African-American chairs will be underrepresented on im-
portant control committees, and overrepresented on those dealing with is-
sues of historical importance to minority communities (e.g., education,
health, and social services). To assess the accuracy of these expectations, we
again employ techniques used by Darcy (1996). First, we divide the com-
mittees in the state legislatures under consideration here into 19, overlap-
ping jurisdictional categories.15 Second, recalling from Table 1 that African
Americans chair approximately 6 percent of all state legislative committees
(116/1990), we can calculate expected numbers of black chairs by multi-
plying the overall percent of black chairs (p) by the number of committees in
each jurisdictional domain (n). For example, in the area of social services
there are 162 committees in our analysis, yielding an expected number of
9.72 African-American chairs: (162) (0.06)5 9.72. After computing a stan-
dard deviation,16 we can then compare the expected prevalence of black
chairs in each jurisdictional domain versus our actual observations.
This analysis, using data from 1999–2000, is summarized in Table 4.17 At
best, it provides only mixed support for our hypotheses. First, in terms of
important control committees that structure their parent chambers’ fiscal
and legislative decisions, we find—contrary to our expectations—that Af-
rican Americans are not significantly underrepresented as chairs on fiscal and
rules committees. Although both categories generate negative Z coefficients,
indicating that there are fewer minority chairs than we would expect, the
differences are neither substantively large nor statistically significant.18
Our expectations fare somewhat better when it comes to committees
dealing with health and social services—areas in which African Americans
have a great interest and in which minority representatives introduce a
disproportionate number of bills. There are more African-American chairs
15The jurisdictional areas are derived from categories developed by the Council of State
Governments and used by Darcy (1996). In alphabetical order, these are: agriculture, bank-
ing/financial institutions, business and commerce, communication, education, elections, en-
ergy, environment/natural resources, ethics, fiscal, government operations, health, insurance,
judiciary, local affairs, public employees, rules, social services, and transportation. Since
committees can fit into more than one category, the numbers used here do not match those in
Table 1.
16Again, we follow Darcy (1996) by calculating the standard deviation as [np(1 p)]1/2.
17Results from the earlier time period (1989–1990) are excluded here for purposes of
brevity, but are available from the authors. With some minor variations, they show much the
same patterns visible in the 1999–2000 data.
18It may also be worth noting that African Americans are not significantly underrepre-
sented as chairs of business and commerce committees; in fact they are slightly overrep-
resented, a fact that may be attributable to recent increases in African-American legislators
who come from business backgrounds (see Holmes, 2000; Orey 2000; but see Clemons and
Jones, 2000). On the other hand, African Americans are significantly underrepresented on
committees that handle banking and financial institution matters, and even more so on
committees with jurisdiction over natural resources, insurance, and agriculture.
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of committees responsible for social services (19) than in any category; this
number is far larger than we would expect based on chance (9.72) and it
generates a robustly significant Z score of 3.07. There are also somewhat
more black chairs of health-oriented committees than we would expect,
although the difference is not statistically significant. Contrary to expecta-
tions, there are slightly fewer African Americans chairing committees in the
educational area, although, again, the difference does not approach statistical
significance.19
TABLE 4
Expected and Observed African-American Chairs by Committee Function:
1999–2000
Committee Function
Number of
Committees
Observed
Black Chairs
Expected
Black Chairs Z
Agriculture 114 1 6.84  2.30
Banking/financial institution 113 2 6.78  1.90
Business and commerce 163 11 9.78 0.40
Communications 115 0 6.9  2.71
Education 136 7 8.16  0.42
Elections 107 3 6.42  1.39
Energy 108 0 6.48  2.62
Environmental/natural
resources
161 3 9.66  2.21
Ethics 97 1 5.82  2.06
Fiscal 183 10 10.98  0.31
Government operations 143 17 8.58 2.96
Health 126 11 7.56 1.27
Insurance 99 3 5.94  1.32
Judiciary/corrections 137 12 8.22 1.36
Local affairs 142 16 8.52 2.59
Public employees 138 2 8.28  2.25
Rules 103 5 6.18  0.49
Social services 162 19 9.72 3.07
Transportation 114 7 6.84 0.06
Totals 2,461 130
19Although not directly related to our initial expectations, several other results from Table
4 deserve at least passing comment. First, although not statistically significant, African
Americans do appear to be somewhat overrepresented as chairs of judiciary/corrections
committees. Since the high incarceration rates of African Americans and their concomitant
cynicism toward the U.S. judicial system have been well documented perhaps this represents
a sanguine development in terms of shoring up diffuse support for the judiciary among
minority communities. Second, given the fact that African Americans are proportionately
more dependent on government employment than are whites, it is perhaps surprising that
African-American legislators are significantly underrepresented as chairs on committees that
deal with matters relating to public employees. Indeed, as the estimates in Table 4 indicate,
they hold less than one-quarter of the chairs predicted in this area. Third, the relatively large
number of black chairs of local affairs committees defies immediate explanation. Since this
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Turning from a description of the pattern of African-American committee
chairs in the state legislatures to attempting to account for some of
the factors influencing that pattern, we developed multivariate re-
gression models, results from which we summarize in Table 5. As outlined
above, our dependent variable is the percentage of black committee chairs
in each chamber in our analysis and our independent variables in-
clude a number of partisan, political, demographic, geographic, and
institutional features. We run separate estimations for 1989–1990 and
1999–2000.20
Overall and viewed together, these results augment the portrayal presented
in Tables 2 and 3. In 1989, during a period of Democratic dominance in the
state legislatures, the principal factor affecting the presence of black com-
mittee chairs was the percentage of black legislators in the chamber. To the
extent that other factors affected the selection of black committee chairs,
their substantive impact was only marginal even if they were statistically
significant. For example, after controlling for other relevant factors, southern
legislatures had fewer black chairs than might otherwise be expected, but the
coefficient is small and its significance modest ( p  0.07). Similarly, while
it is interesting that the interactive variable for black caucus size and Dem-
ocratic control generates a negatively signed coefficient, the size of its impact
is substantively small.
By 1999, after a decade of racial redistricting successfully designed to
bring scores of new African Americans into the state legislatures, but that
also witnessed marked GOP electoral success at the state legislative level,
the dynamics of black committee chair selection had clearly changed.
As the results in the right-hand column of Table 5 show, at the turn
of the millennium the interaction of black legislative presence and
Democratic partisan control had become the predominant factor influenc-
ing the presence of African-American committee chairs. Over the course
of the decade, this term has flipped signs, now showing a strong positive
correlation between the interaction and the selection of black chairs—
chambers with both large numbers of black members and Democratic
category seems to include something of a hodge-podge of committees with varied and what
appear to be rather constrained jurisdictions, it is possible that these positions are essentially
‘‘tokens’’ and indicate only limited legislative power. In this regard, it is perhaps worth noting
that 14 of these 16 committees are found in southern state legislative chambers.
20Since our data are cross-sectional and involve results from both upper and lower cham-
bers (which might threaten the independence of observations), we err on the side of caution,
calculating our results with robust standard errors. We have also opted to report here the
equations that include data from all the states included in our sample, not just those cham-
bers controlled by Democrats. We do so to maximize our statistical leverage and to avoid
charges of selecting on the dependent variable. Results from analysis of just those chambers
with Democratic majorities yield substantive results that are virtually identical to those
reported in Table 5.
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majorities saw larger than expected percentages of black chairs.21
Here, we find the exact opposite picture when compared to 1989. That
is, when examining Democratic-controlled chambers, the percent black in a
state legislature increases the percentage of black chairs.
Interestingly, while the coefficient for the southern regional dummy vari-
able has become positive in the 1999 model, the interactive regional Dem-
ocratic control variable is negatively signed and (at least marginally)
significant ( p  0.085), indicating that in those states that have experienced
TABLE 5
OLS Models (with Robust Standard Errors) of Factors Influencing Percentages of
Black State Legislative Committee Chairs
Variable 1989 1999
Percent black 0.025 n n n 0.056
(0.006) (0.082)
Democratic control 0.040  0.018
(0.039) (0.027)
Southern states  0.030 n 0.035 n n
(0.017) (0.015)
Percent black freshmen  0.020 n n n 0.247
(0.008) (0.218)
Leadership appointment  0.047  0.003
(0.036) (0.010)
Chamber  0.022  0.008
(0.025) (0.007)
Term limits  0.010 n
(0.006)
Percent black  Democratic control  0.013 n n 0.711 n n
(0.006) (0.317)
Southern states  Democratic control  0.060 n
(0.034)
Percent black freshmen  Democratic control 0.012 0.685
(0.009) (0.427)
Leadership appointments  Democratic control 0.052 0.033
(0.039) (0.029)
Chamber  Democratic control 0.038 0.026
(0.031) (0.023)
Term limits  Democratic control 0.027
(0.031)
R2 0.50 0.61
N 73 74
NOTE: npo0.10; n npo0.05; n n npo0.01.
21In part, this change results because the correlation between the percentage of black
representatives in a legislature and Democratic control of the legislature had fallen by the late
1990s, from 0.26 to 0.20. As a result, it was less likely that chambers with substantial African-
American caucuses had Democratic majorities, highlighting the importance of both con-
ditions.
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the most extensive racial redistricting and where (white) Democrats control
the legislative chamber, we see at least somewhat fewer black chairs than in
otherwise similarly situated legislative chambers As previous case studies
have suggested (Orey 2000), there is some evidence of a backlash among
southern white Democratic legislators, although the size of the effect may be
smaller than some had expected.22
Discussion and Conclusions
Over the past few decades, African Americans have made enormous gains
in the number of state legislative seats they hold. Although these gains have
been well documented, researchers have been slower to investigate the im-
pacts of such changes on the quality of black representation. In this article,
we examine one aspect of the growing presence of minority legislators, the
extent to which they chair legislative committees. In doing so, we present
the first comprehensive assessment of this important aspect of state legis-
lative politics, illuminating the extent to which black legislators have been
able to translate electoral victories into real legislative power and the
conditions under which this is likely to occur.
The data paint a somewhat mixed portrait of the status of black legislative
clout at the beginning of the new millennium. On the one hand, there is much
positive news. Contrary to our expectations, compared to their overall num-
bers in state legislatures, African Americans are not significantly underrepre-
sented as chairs of the important legislative committees that shape the states’
fiscal policies and legislative processes, a clear indication that black legislators
are involved in key taxing, spending, and procedural decisions. Equally im-
portant, African Americans are considerably overrepresented as chairs of com-
mittees dealing with issues of health care and social services, traditionally areas
of strong interest to the black community. This indicates that in policy areas of
greatest interest to their constituents, black state legislators have been able to
move beyond the symbolism of merely holding elective office into real po-
sitions of power where they can provide significant substantive representation.
Moreover, our data indicate that black legislators have been able to continue
exercising this substantive power even after a decade in which the GOP made
enormous gains at the state level, significantly reducing Democratic power in
the nation’s state capitols. Especially when viewed in historical perspective
regarding where African-American representation was a mere two generations
ago, the size and resilience of these gains are notable.
But there is disturbing news as well. Over the course of the 1990s, gains
in elected black state legislators were not matched by similar gains in
committee chairs. Indeed, there was a net gain of only one during the
22The term-limit variable also behaves as expected, generating a negative and modestly
significant coefficient, suggesting that term limits have something of a pernicious effect on
minority representation.
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decade. In large measure, this disjuncture has partisan roots; the near total
absence of black Republican state legislators means that legislative chambers
with GOP majorities have very few African-American committee chairs.
This partisan shift in legislative control greatly attenuated the impact of the
scores of new African-American legislators elected in the wake of the 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act, who otherwise would have chaired
many more state legislative committees. Is this mere coincidence? Or are the
two developments related? Intense academic and public debate has sur-
rounded this and similar questions, and our data do not allow us to make
definitive determinations here. It is worth noting, however, that there is a
significant correlation between the increase in the percentage of black leg-
islators in a state legislative chamber between 1989 and 1999, and the
likelihood that the chamber would switch from a Democratic to a Repub-
lican majority (r5 0.30; p  0.01). Although we acknowledge that numer-
ous other factors besides racial redistricting are likely to be at work in driving
this partisan change (see Lublin and Voss, 2000 for a lengthy analysis of this
topic; at the congressional level, see also Engstrom, 2006), the correlation
does suggest something of the stark conundrum facing the nation’s African-
American population and politicians: real legislative power requires the
election of large contingents of African-American state legislators, but con-
ditions conducive to such electoral results may endanger the Democratic
majorities that are also necessary for significant black policy impact.
Overall, our results reinforce the point that in the contemporary state
legislative political environment, black legislators have become key caucuses
within the Democratic Party; wherever the party holds a majority and its
black members hold sufficient seats, a sizable percentage of committee chairs
is virtually assured, regardless of other institutional or political factors. In
such chambers, descriptive representation clearly has translated itself into
substantive representation, assuming that African-American committee
chairs engage in policy outcomes of interest to African Americans. Con-
versely, however, the other side of the proverbial coin is that absent the
confluence of relatively large numbers and Democratic partisan control, the
prospects for African-American committee chairs are bleak indeed. The near
total absence of black members in the Republican legislative caucuses of
necessity relegates black legislators to secondary or tertiary leadership roles in
chambers controlled by the GOP. In such chambers, African-American
legislators retain important functions, but as Grofman (2006:64) has re-
cently noted, these will be less substantive in nature and more in terms of
‘‘sounding the alarm and providing vocal and potentially embarrassing
protests against attempts to harm minority interests.’’
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